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Alternative Business Models and Entrepreneurship :  




While environmental regulation of the car can be traced back to the early 1960s (Watkins, 
1991; Lenz and Cozzarini, 1999), in recent years, the combined pressures of reducing toxic 
emissions as well as emissions of greenhouse gases have brought a new impetus to both 
environmental regulation of the car and to the technologies needed to address these. In 
many instances these two agendas call for somewhat contradictory technological solutions, 
although, frequently, much more of a systems approach than has been used in the past 
seems the natural path, something that in many respects is novel to the industry. Beyond 
the automotive industry, the new regulatory climate also calls for changes in the context 
within which the industry and its products operate, including such areas as changes to 
existing regulation and the role of government, operating practices, consumer attitudes, and 
approaches to repair and maintenance. 
Thus the past 20 years or so have seen significant advances in both the powertrain and the 
body/chassis structure areas; lightweight structures using new materials (other than pressed 
welded sheet steel) and new powertrain solutions are now relatively commonplace 
compared with even a few model generations ago. The first volume produced hybrids, the 
Toyota Prius and Honda Insight, were launched in 1997 and 1998 respectively, but now a 
wide range of hybrids is available. Hybrids have improved, while more advanced versions, 
using a smaller internal combustion (IC) engine – or ͚ƌaŶge eǆteŶdeƌ͛ – are now also 
available, as in the Chevrolet Volt and Opel/Vauxhall Ampera as well as being optional on 
the BMW i3. ͚Mild hybrid͛ and stop-start systems have become commonplace in recent 
years, while hydrogen fuel cell cars – strictly speaking also hybrids – have been available for 
lease in limited numbers in Japan and California and were launched for sale by Toyota and 
Hyundai in several countries in 2016 and 2017 respectively.  
Such technologies sounded far into the future even in the mid 1990s, but as a side-effect 
they have opened up a new space for entrepreneurial activity as typified by Tesla and 
Autolib, two case studies reviewed in this article, while these have also brought to the 
industry new, potentially disruptive business models. This contribution will place much of 
this discussion beyond the merely technological and much more within the context of both 
the socio-technical transitions and business model literatures. These will be introduced, 
initially in the context of the response by incumbents in the automotive industry to the EV 
transition, while exploring the inertia in existing systems, before discussing these two 
innovative cases. This is then followed by a brief exploration of where other tensions are 
likely to arise in the transition from an IC to aŶ EV ͚ƌegiŵe͛ ǁith a view to possible future 
work in this area. 
Policy challenges and assumptions 
Much of the move towards greater use of electric powertrain has been driven by 
government regulation, which, unfortunately has traditionally been informed by a view of 
the issues surrounding sustainable ͚automobility͛ as primarily, or even solely, technological. 
Under this approach, consumers can then be informed and will automatically make the 
  
͚ƌight͛ ĐhoiĐe – the largely fictional rational human (homo economicus) of classical economic 
theory still often informs official thinking. Challenging this notion, the cultural constraints 
within which consumers make their choices have been highlighted by, for example, Reisch 
(2005/2006). She argues that merely providing consumers with information is not enough to 
induce more sustainable behaviour. This argument is shared by Hobson (2001), who 
challenges traditional positivist policy approaches that provide information and expect 
ĐoŶsuŵeƌs to ƌespoŶd ǁith lifestǇle ĐhaŶges iŶ a ͚ƌatioŶal͛ ŵaŶŶeƌ. IŶstead she fiŶds iŶ heƌ 
ƌeseaƌĐh that people eŶteƌ suĐh iŶfoƌŵatioŶ iŶ theiƌ ͚disĐuƌsiǀe ĐoŶsĐiousŶess͛ ĐoŶtestiŶg 
certain of the aspects in the evidence presented, while accepting others. Inserting more 
sustaiŶaďle pƌaĐtiĐes iŶto people͛s fieƌĐelǇ pƌoteĐted ͚lifestǇles͛ then becomes the real 
challenge (Hobson, 2001). In this way, many of the barriers to the introduction of new 
technologies are not technological, but rather sociological, psychological and cultural. Once 
the technological barriers have been overcome, potential new, entrepreneurial entrants 
with business models that respond to dissolving those ͚softeƌ͛ ďaƌƌieƌs ĐaŶ fiŶd a ǁaǇ 
through the traditionally high barriers to entry into what socio-technical transition (STT) 
thinkers call the autoŵotiǀe ͚ƌegiŵe͛ (Geels, 2002). This STT model introduces the 
͚ŵultileǀel peƌspeĐtiǀe͛, distiŶguishiŶg three levels at which innovation plays out; at the top 
are the landscape conditions, which in this case would include such aspects as the price of 
oil, the desire for carbon reduction, existing infrastructures. At the bottom level there is a 
constant trickling of innovative niches, which can embody new technologies, novel business 
models, or other forms of innovation, challenging the existing regime. Most of these are 
ultimately unsuccessful and disappear without trace, but under certain conditions, some of 
these can bundle and successfully challenge the existing regime. For, in between sit existing 
͚ƌegiŵes͛, sets of pƌaĐtiĐes, iŶstitutioŶs aŶd ƌegulatioŶs that haǀe deǀeloped to suppoƌt a 
given set of incumbent technologies and the actors that provide them (Geels, 2002). Geels͛ 
classic case study describes the gradual transition from sailing ships to steam ships in this 
context (Geels, 2002). In some cases, actors such as government can also play an active role 
in promoting such niches, or bundles of niches thƌough a pƌoĐess of ͚stƌategiĐ ŶiĐhe 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt͛ ;Hoogma et al. 2002). 
MaƌketiŶg teĐhŶiƋues suĐh as ͚ŶudgiŶg͛ have also been used by industry and particularly 
government to overcome any constraints to promote a greener agenda (Peattie, 1995, 
1999). As Hart (1997) reminds us, industry – in this case the automotive industry in the 
broadest sense – also has a fundamental role to play. Clearly, if consumer choice is limited 
only to environmentally positive choices, the outcomes will be environmentally positive; 
buyers will only buy green. However, where more sustainable practices already enjoy a 
measure of social acceptance, such change is more likely. It is important that a more 
sustainable car type is still appealing; people still have to want it as well as need it – even if 
suĐh ͚Ŷeeds͛ aƌe ofteŶ iŶ the ŵiŶd of the ďeholdeƌ. Foƌ ƌeal pƌogƌess iŶ this aƌea ǁe should 
therefore look well beyond the technological, yet technology is also our starting point. 
Sanne (2002) explores the potential for direct government intervention through legal and 
organizational change, for example, in order to force consumers into specific greener 
choices analogous with the now widespread ban on smoking in public places. 
Electric Vehicle Technologies 
Geels (2005), describes the transition in the transport system from the predominant use of 
horses to that of cars, but he also highlights the fact that during this transition phase the car 
featured a number of competing powertrain technologies, notably steam, electric traction 
and petrol internal combustion. In fact, in the US there was a roughly equal split in terms of 
market share of these technologies around 1900 (Wakefield, 1993). IŶ Geels͛ SoĐio-Technical 
Transition model, it is shown that ͚landscape͛ conditions at that time, such as the sudden 
  
availability of cheap oil in the wake of the ͚SpiŶdletop͛ gusheƌ iŶ Teǆas iŶ ϭϵϬϬ, determined 
that petrol IC won, especially after the invention of the ͚self-starter͛ by Kettering, first 
offered by Cadillac in 1912. Steam power was ultimately abandoned due to weight, the 
potential danger of boiler explosion (in reality, largely solved by 1910 due to improvements 
in metallurgy), but also due to the inherent loss of efficiency of external combustion such as 
steam, although its advantages were also recognized: high torque from standstill, smooth 
operation, no need for a gearbox, great reliability.  The main problem for EVs, even then, 
was the range limited by battery capacity and the time it took to charge those batteries, 
however this did mean that they were considered suited to particular niches, as indeed they 
haǀe ďeeŶ eǀeƌ siŶĐe as iŶ the eǆaŵple of the UK ŵilk ͚float͛ foƌ sileŶt eaƌlǇ ŵoƌŶiŶg ŵilk 
delivery and AGVs (automatic guided vehicles) in plants and warehouses, where use of IC 
would adversely affect air quality . Thus in reality, neither steam, nor EV went away, but 
became marginalized technologies in the new automotive regime, much like we still ride 
horses and still use sailing boats. However, with what the transition scholars Đall ͚laŶdsĐape͛ 
changes (Geels, 2002, 2005; Dijk, 2014; Truffer et al. 2017), such marginal technologies, now 
confined to niches, can become more viable again and that is what appears to be happening 
to the EV, and to a lesser extent fuel cells (Peters and Coles, 2010).  
It is clear, that for the next decade or so we will still have internal combustion (IC) as the 
dominant technology, although the advent of government policies to ban sales of new 
internal combustion (IC) engined vehicles, suggested for the UK and China for 2040, Scotland 
for 2032, while 2025 has been mentioned in the Netherlands and 2020 in Norway, will speed 
this process. Fossil fuel contains a very large amount of energy for its volume, which makes 
it difficult to replace as a compact portable energy source. The price of fossil fuel is likely to 
become more volatile ͚post-peak͛ as recent history has shown, making consumers more 
insecure, but engine efficiency will keep pace for a while (Heinberg, 2007; Sperling and 
Cannon, 2007). It should be noted that hybrids and plug-in hybrids still use an IC engine as a 
range extender, and in many cases hybridization is seen as a way of making IC engines more 
energy and emissions efficient. In the longer term, these IC engines may give way to a 
hydrogen fuel cell. This technology has become viable for automotive applications as a result 
of the entrepreneurial work by Ballard in particular (Koppel, 1999; Peters and Coles, 2010) 
and is still seen by many as the most promising longer term solution. Yet at present, most 
hydrogen still derives from fossil fuels, although fuel cell alternatives such as methanol and 
ammonia can be derived from renewable feedstocks. LPG, CNG and biofuels can also be 
used in IC engines, which makes those attractive from a toxic emissions perspective. 
However, such technologies should increasingly be seen as merely postponing the 
inevitable. For a more durable solution to the issue of transport energy we need to tap more 
directly into the fresh solar energy that we receive on a daily basis. We need to move away 
from finite fossilized solar energy and embrace direct solar energy through photo-voltaics, 
wind power, tidal, wave and similar renewable technologies (Kendall, 2008). 
In some respects, the electrification of the car is an inevitable trajectory (Nieuwenhuis 2014, 
Fig. 12.3). Huber and Mills (2005) argue that a shift towards more electric energy use is 
inevitable in a broader sense and in line with long term energy trends going back millennia.  
They point out that energy is effectively unlimited, rather it is our ability to capture it that is 
limited. Yet some of these technologies also require new infrastructures, which can hamper 
or delay a transition. Volume produced EVs became available around 2010, with Mitsubishi, 
Nissan and Renault among the mainstream carmakers leading this trend. This also lent more 
credibility to more specialist, entrepreneurial EV producers, such as Tesla who are 
positioning their EVs as premium products, design-led in the way Apple products are 
  
perceived as premium products.1 In reality, a direct comparison of EVs with IC cars is 
unrealistic; they are a different kind of product and this is how they need to be presented to 
the market. Modern EVs contain a significant amount of novel technology combined with 
new esoteric materials; while modern hybrids combine state of the art IC technology with 
state of the art EV technology.  In other words, they are bound to cost more than a 
conventional IC car – why would we even expect them to be directly competitive on price? 
Tesla͛s aƌguŵeŶt is theƌefoƌe souŶd – pay a premium for an EV in the way you pay a 
premium for an Apple computer.  
This does of course require a comparable functionality. And here it gets more complex; 
although EVs have a different functionality from IC cars, the functionality comparison 
depends on how you value range, for example, or charging time, against such features as 
ease of opeƌatioŶ, sileŶĐe iŶ opeƌatioŶ, aďilitǇ to ͚fill up͛ at hoŵe, loǁeƌ ŵaiŶteŶaŶĐe Ŷeeds, 
smoother acceleration, or lower running costs.  At the same time, one has to accept that 
from an environmental perspective, only electric vehicles give the option – provided a zero 
carbon generating mix is developed – of ultimately zero carbon and zero emissions 
transport, at least at point of use. This is true both for battery-electric and hydrogen fuel cell 
electric vehicles (FCEV). A number of jurisdictions have introduced specific targets for 
battery electric and plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEV). Thus the US is aiming to have one million 
plug-in vehicles (PIVs) on the road by 2015, China is aiming for five million by 2020 with 
annual sales of one million by 2020 and a 20-30% market share by 2030 (Shulock, et al. 
2011). Similarly, Japan is planning to have two million FCEVs in use by 2025, while South 
Korea is aiming for 50 000 BEVs and PHEVs by 2020 with these constituting 50% of new car 
sales by the 2030s (Shulock, et al. 2011). Similar targets have been suggested for the EU, but 
no decision has been made. 
New Automotive Business Models? 
Incumbents 
Despite the emphasis on new entrants as a result of such new technologies, thus far, the 
transition to EV has seen incumbents as dominant players, certainly in terms of volumes of 
EVs sold. The main success story in the EV sector has been the established player Renault-
Nissan, at least in terms of the sheer number of cars built and sold. The Nissan Leaf, in 
particular, does not embody any radical departure in terms of business model, although 
Renault at least has sought to separate the battery from the car in terms of ownership and 
payment, which has seen some success in reducing both the price and the risk to the 
consumer in terms of new battery technology adoption; batteries typically represent around 
half the cost of an EV aŶd ‘eŶault͛s offeƌ of ďatteƌies foƌ lease has alloǁed it a degƌee of 
differentiation in the market. 
Yet, existing mainstream vehicle manufacturers, even those that have launched EVs, have 
been relatively cautious in their pursuit of innovative business models, initiatives such as the 
Peugeot Mu concept or the Nissan-Suŵitoŵo ͚seĐoŶd life͛ idea to re-use automotive 
batteries in static emergency back-up operations notwithstanding. For many vehicle 
manufacturers, the preferred option seems to be to make EVs as much like traditional cars 
as possible by driving down battery and system costs and hence reduce purchase price or 
lease rates for customers. As incumbents, the established vehicle manufacturers have 
crucial advantages. These include brand recognition, established retail, distribution and 
support networks; vast experience in marketing cars; the pivotal vehicle integration 
                                                          
1 Even though, unlike Apple products, Teslas benefit in most countries from government 
suďsidies; ǁithout these, theiƌ pƌiĐiŶg ǁould ďe eǀeŶ ŵoƌe ͚pƌeŵiuŵ͛. 
  
competencies, political leverage; access to financial resources and comprehensive technical 
skills. Furthermore, a generally cautious approach has been vindicated by some high-profile 
failures in terms of business model innovation around EVs, most notably with regard to 
battery-swap entrepreneur Shai Agassi and his Better Place venture (Christensen et al. 
2012), in which Renault had some involvement. Direct experience with EV experiments 
peƌĐeiǀed to haǀe ͚failed͛ haǀe also Đoloured the approach of some vehicle manufacturers, 
such as PSA Peugeot Citroen with their EV trials in places such as La Rochelle and Coventry 
;Oďeƌŵolleƌ, ϮϬϭϯͿ. EǀeŶ the ͚suĐĐess͛ stoƌies of ďusiŶess iŶŶoǀatioŶ, suĐh as that of Tesla, 
explored below, deserve rather more careful evaluation when the industry is considered in 
an historical perspective (Wells and Nieuwenhuis 2015). 
An imaginative model of future, more sustainable, motorized personal transport was 
proposed by Mitchell et al. (2010) who worked for General Motors. They argued that most 
growth in car demand this century will take place in the Far East and that the wealthier 
areas in that part of the world are also increasingly urbanized; a dedicated urban vehicle can 
therefore be justified. In urban environments, even very extensive ones, average speed and 
daily mileage for a car is likely to be limited even in these mega-cities, making electric 
vehicles particularly suited. In addition, the need to reduce toxic pollutants in urban areas, 
where the concentration of potential victims is so much higher, favours EVs. The small 2-
seater vehicles proposed by Mitchell et al. (2010) feature autonomous and connected 
driving and they are fully integrated with their environment, aware of other vehicles and 
obstacles, thus avoiding accidents and, as a result, the need for heavy crash structures and 
airbags. To ǁhat eǆteŶt this is still ͚dƌiǀiŶg͛ is opeŶ to deďate. Peƌhaps a ŵodel Đould eŵeƌge 
whereby cars are controlled by the infrastructure in urban areas and on motorways, but by 
the driver in more technologically challenging rural environments.  
Despite the inherent inertia in the car industry (cf. Wells and Nieuwenhuis 2012; Wells et al. 
2012; Steinhilber et al. 2013) much of this move is driven – albeit under pressure from 
legislators – by the mainstream incumbent car companies, notably Renault-Nissan, BMW, 
General Motors and increasingly others such as VW, efforts from the likes of Tesla and 
Chinese battery and vehicle producer BYD notwithstanding. This is a major step for the 
industry. Outside observers often fail to understand that making an EV involves a lot more 
than fitting a battery and motors to an existing petrol or diesel car. In order to be truly 
competitive, the EV has to be optimized as an EV, rather than compromised. In addition, the 
industry has to consider new questions, that bring with them a change in culture, as people 
ask the ƋuestioŶ of ǁheƌe the ͚fuel͛ Đoŵes fƌoŵ, aŶd paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ its ͚gƌeeŶ͛ ĐƌedeŶtials. Caƌ 
manufacturers, are now expected to interface with electricity providers, infrastructure 
providers and they are therefore under increasing pressure to develop new business models, 
for value is added differently along this newly emerging EV value chain. All this means major, 
disruptive change, which is why some new, more entrepreneurial entrants such as Tesla can 
succeed in an industry traditionally featuring very high barriers to entry (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: How EVs Disrupt the Automotive Value Chain (short-medium term) 
Value chain link Typical IC Typical EV Examples of 
disruption 
Materials supply Iron ore, bauxite, 
plastics, rubber 
Bauxite, plastics, 
lithium, rare earths, 
rubber 
More lightweight 
materials; more rare 
earths and lithium, 
etc. 
  
Component supply Engines, 
transmissions, cast 
iron and aluminium 
Motors, controllers, 
batteries, pressed and 
cast aluminium, 
carbon fibre 




delivery systems, etc.; 
need for large 
increase in battery 
production capacity, 
etc. 




More emphasis on 
lightweight 
body/chassis 
materials: e.g. Al 
Tesla, CF BMW I; need 




Largely unskilled sales 
staff 
Higher skill levels 
needed for sales staff 
to match customer 
with technology 
Tesla has integrated 
sales and distribution; 
BMW, Nissan have 
dedicated EV staff 
Aftermarket Regular repair and 
maintenance; accident 
repair; vast network of 
informal and small 
repair shops 
Reduced need for 
mechanical repair and 
maintenance; still 
accident repair; higher 
skill levels needed to 
deal with high 
voltages and new 
materials 
Accident repair may 
reduce as cars become 
more connected; 
aftermarket repair has 
to become more high 
skilled and more 
specialist; need to link 
with energy suppliers. 
End-of-life Vehicles highly 
recycled (95% in EU); 
tƌade iŶ ͚Đoƌes͛ foƌ 
remanufacturing. 
Vehicles highly 
recyclable; longer use 
phase; battery second 
life 
New skills needed to 
deal with ELV EVs; 
new businesses to 
manage battery take-
back and re-use 
 
It is clear from Table 1 that change is to be expected at various points along the automotive 
value chain and that this suggests that resistance to the changes leading to a transition from 
IC to EV is inevitable. What is not always appreciated is that such resistance can occur at 
various points along that value chain, as the industry makes its shift towards new alternative 
business models (Wells 2008, 2013; Wells and Nieuwenhuis 2015). The resistance to change 
is not due exclusively to the inertia among vehicle assemblers, who have sunk investments 
in IC engines, in gearboxes (only BMW and Jaguar among major manufacturers outsource 
these), but who are also often heavily wedded to the Budd all-steel body system 
(Nieuwenhuis and Wells 2007). Upstream from these are the suppliers who currently supply 
around 60-70% of the value of a new car. It is here that the very existence of some firms is at 
stake. Although the larger firms such as Continental (once known primarily for tyres but now 
a highly integrated supplier with increasing expertise in EV components) or Mahle (originally 
a piston manufacturer, but now emphasizing cutting edge IC technologies such as range 
extenders and superchargers), smaller firms specializing in specific IC components such as 
pistons, crankshafts, camshafts or conventional gearboxes could well fail.  
  
New entrants 
Conversely, new firms with expertise developed outside the automotive sector that is now 
becoming relevant to that automotive sector may well take their place in a newly emerging 
value chain. Examples are Google with its growing expertise in autonomous vehicle 
technology, built on its mapping work, Apple which is increasingly dominant in in-car 
connectivity, or Panasonic or LG, already major suppliers of traction batteries for EVs to 
established firms such as GM. Similarly, Chinese firm BYD has shifted its expertise in 
batteries for portable devices such as cell phones and laptop computers into automotive by 
setting up its own automotive division offering both IC and electric vehicles, whereby they 
have become major global players in niche EV technologies such as taxis and buses. On a 
smaller scale, highly innovative entrepreneurial firms such as Twike, with their lightweight 
human power-electric hybrid, or Riversimple are presenting themselves at the gates of the 
industry with both novel technologies – in the latter case a small scale hydrogen fuel cell 
combined with ultra lightweight body-chassis structure – and radical new business models 
(Wells, 2016; Riversimple 2017). Most high profile among these new entrants is Tesla, while 
the way in which the shift to EV can generate novel business models can also be further 
illustrated by Autolib in France; these are discussed in more detail below. 
Emerging Automotive Business Models 
Without delving too deeply into the business models literature (relevant contributions here 
are, e.g. Bohnsack et al. 2014, Wells, 2013, although more generic work on business models 
could also be cited), for the purposes of the present analysis, the essence of the emerging 
automotive business models is, first of all, where along the automotive value chain value is 
captured – leaǀiŶg aside foƌ the ŵoŵeŶt the iŵpliĐatioŶ of liŶeaƌitǇ iŶ the teƌŵ ǀalue ͚ĐhaiŶ͛ 
for a phenomenon that in reality is often more complex and web-like – and how that value is 
captured by a particular firm. In this context, it is not only the car itself that needs to evolve, 
the way we use it needs to be subject to a similar evolution as part of new business models 
(e.g. Wells, 2008, 2013). This often involves players in acquiring new knowledge outside 
their existing areas of expertise (Rajala and Westerlund, 2007). The existing automotive 
value chain has been developed over the past 130 years or so and could be summarized in 




The existing, established volume car producers capture only part of this value chain, as 
outlined in Figure 2. The box captures the typical activities of existing OEMs in the IC car 
regime. The very high level of vertical integration Henry Ford adopted in order to support his 
pioneering mass production system (cf. Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 2007) was gradually 
disintegrated as a supply sector grew up that was able to support the volumes needed to 
feed his mass production system and that of an increasing number of other, competing 
players, notably GM and Chrysler. In addition, retail and distribution are almost always 
carried out primarily by independent firms, although manufacturers may retain some 
dealers in prime sites. Where manufacturers do often still retain an interest is in vehicle 
fiŶaŶĐe. The ďoǆ laďelled ͚fiŶaŶĐial iŶteƌŵediaƌies͛ Đaptuƌes Ŷot oŶlǇ suĐh fiŶaŶĐe 
companies, but also leasing firms and the growing numbers of car clubs and other car 
sharing models, such as those operated by daily rental companies, which are themselves 





















































Tesla͛s fiƌst Đaƌ ǁas the ‘oadsteƌ, esseŶtiallǇ a ŵodified Lotus, ďuilt ďǇ Lotus iŶ the UK aŶd 
fitted ǁith Tesla͛s Ŷoǀel ďatteƌǇ paĐk ŵade up of aŶ aƌƌaǇ of laptop ďatteƌies; a teĐhŶologǇ 
that has since been shared with other manufacturers. Despite some teething problems, the 
cooperation with Lotus allowed Tesla to acquire new expertise in vehicle integration, while it 
also recruited staff from existing car makers to build on this (Rajala and Westerlund, 2007). 
With the introduction of the Model S in mid-2013, Tesla became synonymous with 
entrepreneurial success in the emerging EV market. This new electric luxury car was 
immediately well received by the specialist media and by customers (van Gilluwe and 
Rogers, 2014). It was also accompanied by a novel highly integrated business model, as 
outlined in Figure 3. 
Figure 3 
 
Tesla͛s ǀalue ĐhaiŶ Đaptuƌe iŶĐludes the production of the battery pack, for which it is 
ďuildiŶg its ͚MegafaĐtoƌǇ͛ iŶ Neǀada. It fuƌtheƌ iŶĐludes ǀehiĐle asseŵďlǇ aloŶg siŵilaƌ liŶes 
as used for conventional luxury cars, albeit with higher than usual aluminium content, while 
the car is also built on what constitutes a separate chassis which incorporates the battery 
pack. Assembly takes place in a former GM-Toyota joint venture plant at Fremont, Northern 
California. In addition, the Tesla business model captures retail and distribution in that the 
firm, unusually, owns all its own dealers and sales outlets, which also handle repair and 
maintenance, while finance is also handled direct. Beyond this, Tesla ensures its own energy 
distribution for all its cars through a dedicated charger network and it has moved into 
energy generation via solar panels through its Solar City subsidiary, although Teslas can also 
be charged on other networks, hence the partial capture of that box in the figure. Such a 
level of vertical integration has not been seen in the autoŵotiǀe iŶdustƌǇ siŶĐe Foƌd͛s 
pioneering days. Not surprising, perhaps, this approach appears more in-line with Silicon 
Valley precedent such as Apple, than automotive companies. It has also been able to finance 
this potentially high risk venture because a new generation of investors, more used to 
internet-based firms with largely virtual assets than the fixed assets that dominate the 
automotive sector, are used to valuing a company on its potential rather than its actual 
current value, as already seen with firms such as Facebook, Google or Amazon. It is also 


























͚oǁŶeƌship͛ of the Đustoŵeƌ, as she/he is suƌƌouŶded ďǇ a set of seƌǀiĐes aŶd iŶteƌfaĐes 
controlled directly by these firms. 
Autolib 
Although the Tesla business model breaks away from that of incumbent firms, particularly in 
its level of vertical integration, it still largely reproduces the prevailing automotive regime in 
teƌŵs of pƌiǀate oǁŶeƌship aŶd ͚useƌship͛ of cars.2 By contrast, other new entrants are 
developing more radical business models that are based around product-service systems 
(Williams, 2006; Cook 2018). Important developments in this area include car sharing 
sĐheŵes, oƌ Đaƌ Đluďs, aŶd ͚sale of seƌǀiĐe͛ ďusiŶess ŵodels, suĐh as the oŶe adopted Welsh 
hydrogen fuel-cell start-up Riversimple (Wells, 2016; Riversimple 2017). 
Autolib is an example of this newly emerging business model in that it involves a car sharing 
scheme in Paris and its surrounding Ile de France region, using a dedicated design of EV. It is 
run by the Bolloré Group, a family-owned business, founded in 1822. Their main interest in 
EVs derives from their battery expertise, a unique design of lithium metal polymer (LMP) 
battery, for which they hold all the patents and which is built by their Batscap division. It has 
no liquid electrolyte and with an operating temperature of between 60-80 degrees C it 
means it operates at a stable temperature, so no cooling system is needed and it works at all 
ambient temperatures. The company found a development partner in CeComp in Italy, who 
developed the car, the Bluecar, which was designed and built by Pininfarina as a 
subcontractor to CeComp. More recently Bolloré have linked up with Renault for the 
development of future vehicles. 
Groupe Bolloré  won the Autolib tender, issued by the City of Paris and its fellow local 
authorities in 2011, with the Bluecar. It was able to combine the vehicle with its in-house 
data management and automated interface terminal maker IER, which is a world leader in 
terminals for public services (e.g. automated check-in at airports). It was also able to use its 
in-house telecoms consultant Polyconseil. For the first time, therefore, Bolloré was able to 
meet a market requirement by combining its various, apparently disparate, areas of activity 
and expertise in the creation of a new business model. In addition, it developed new 
relationships with outside firms to plug any gaps in its expertise, such as in vehicle 
development and integration. By this process it also acquired new knowledge in the pursuit 
of its new business model (Rajala and Westerlund, 2007). Autolib covers 47 local authorities 
in the Ile de France, with Paris at the centre. The project runs around 4000 cars and employs 
more than 1200 people. Each Autolib station has 4-6 spaces, and a terminal for signing in. 
Like other European cities, such as London, Paris has a particulate and NOx pollution 
problem due in no small part to the widespread use of diesel cars. This means they often 
breach EU air quality limits; Autolib with its zero emissions EVs helps address this. The 
average rental of a car from Autolib is about 40mins and 10km for Premium (=annual) 
subscribers. Monthly subscribers tend to use the cars about 3 hours each rental. The IT 
solution will find a parking/charging space either automatically or via the call centre which is 
also part of the scheme; the central control/call centre at Vaucresson in suburban Paris, 
works 24/7. Running a small car in Paris would normally cost around €2600 a year, which 
compares unfavourably with the Autolib subscription. Paris is not a car-friendly city, which 
helps people shift from their own car to Autolib, which guarantees a parking space, for 
example.  
 
                                                          
2 Do note that many cars are not sold to end-users, but are leased or provided by some other financial 





Figure 4 is an attempt to summarise the Autolib business model. Autolib controls a key 
component, as with a conventional car maker, in that it supplies the battery and controls the 
design and manufacture, even though these are subcontracted. It also controls its own 
distribution and deals direct with the end user. Autolib also takes care of the financial side of 
the project and runs its own energy distribution via its Autolib charging network. In this 
sense, then, Autolib captures a much larger part of the value chain than conventional car 
companies. 
Transitioning to an EV regime 
Downstream from the assemblers, changes are also to be expected, as dealers and the 
recovery and vehicle repair sector need to acquire new skills to deal with EVs. The 
aftermarket sector, as a whole, will also see firms fail that are too reliant on IC technology, 
while new firms with EV expertise will replace them. Institutional and regulatory changes 
will also be needed as current government legislation in most respects is based on the 
assumption of particular vehicle configurations and technologies, which have become 
iŶtegƌal paƌts of the ĐuƌƌeŶt autoŵotiǀe ͚ƌegiŵe͛ ;Đf. Geels, 2002, 2005; Wells et al. 2012). In 
addition, governments at national and local level have experienced policy challenges with 
regard to EVs, particularly where the agenda has been to leverage investments in local 
charging infrastructures in order to attract investment from the EV manufacturing sector. 
Many local authorities operate planning rules that make the installation of charging points 
challenging. Similarly, government support in terms of R&D programs and other incentives 
has some political traction but is inevitably also seen as controversial; the media debate in 
the US over battery technology pioneer A123 Systems and luxury hybrid-electric car 
producer Fisker continues even today. Both were recipients of US government funding and 
were subsequently declared bankrupt; highlightiŶg MazzuĐato͛s ;ϮϬϭϯͿ ŶotioŶ that 
government can take risks where private sector players cannot. Similarly, the ongoing 
debate about the cost of incentives for EVs in Norway. As a consequence, there is a sense in 
which there is an apparently lucrative market with high growth potential, but which needs a 


























combination of participants in order to unlock those opportunities. Such moves are 
pƌeliŵiŶaƌǇ to aŶǇ shift iŶ the ͚ƌegiŵe͛ fƌoŵ the ĐuƌƌeŶt IC-dominant system, to one where 
EV is dominant (Dijk, 2014; Truffer, et al. 2017). 
On the face of it, the benefits of EVs in reducing GHG emissions in areas with high carbon 
generating capacity – such as China – is more limited. Yet electric powertrains have a 
number of inherent environmental advantages over existing IC engines and proposed IC 
alternatives such as biofuels, CNG or LPG. Over time, these liquid fuels will become higher in 
carbon content due to increasing use of CTL (coal-to-liquid) and also the increasing 
proportion of fuels deƌiǀed fƌoŵ taƌ saŶds ;O͛SulliǀaŶ, 2017). At the same time, electricity 
generation is likely to become lower in carbon as a result of the growth in renewables such 
as wind, solar, tidal and also geothermal and nuclear power. Kendall (2008) argues, 
therefore, we should reduce our dependence on liquid fuels in any case, as the potential for 
eleĐtƌiĐitǇ to ďeĐoŵe iŶĐƌeasiŶglǇ zeƌo eŵissioŶs oŶ a ͚ǁell-to-ǁheel͛ ďasis is inevitably 
much greater than that for fossil fuels and even biofuels. This alone will increasingly serve to 
support the EV in favour of IC, as the need to reduce carbon from our economies and toxic 
emissions from our environment – particularly in urban areas – becomes a more pressing 
policy and public health priority. However, the challenge now is how to introduce EVs to the 
public and also at what speed can they and their infrastructure be rolled out? This could 
logically lead to business models that bundle EVs with energy generation, distribution and 
supply.  
EVs are still often seen as primarily an urban solution, however more recent research has 
shown that EVs can be equally useful in rural settings (Newman et al. 2014a,b,c). In much of 
rural Europe, the distance from a typical farm or village to the nearest market town and back 
is normally well within the range of an EV, and other types of alternative short range vehicle, 
such as the VSPs (͚voitures sans permis͛ – as iŶ FƌaŶĐe ŵaŶǇ ĐaŶ ďe dƌiǀeŶ ǁithout a dƌiǀeƌ͛s 
licence) popular in rural parts of France – so called L-Category microcars – are also primarily 
found in rural areas, despite their limited range. The need for personal motorised mobility is 
greater in rural areas, where regular public transport links are often unfeasible. Rural areas 
are also often well placed to generate electricity using zero carbon technologies such as 
micro-hydro, wind or solar due to the availability of land to locate such infrastructure. 
Several rural EV initiatives are taking place from Bavaria, California and Denmark to Wales to 
underline this point (Newman et al. 2014). EVs can therefore find application much as 
current IC cars and in such a context can offer opportunities to local entrepreneurs able to 
combine renewable energy supply and distribution with EV support in a rural area. It should 
be noted, however, that in the light of slow replacement demand, it will require many years 
to transform the stock of cars in circulation to EV and reap the full benefits in terms of zero 
or reduced emissions; IC bans from urban areas could well help in this respect by at least 
cleaning the air where large numbers of people are present. It should also perhaps be noted 
that EVs currently use several materials and technologies that may themselves be in short 
supply within a generation and that may in fact create new and possibly unforeseen 
environmental problems – the constant research into and search for possible alternatives is 
therefore crucial. 
However, the generating aspects should also be highlighted. EVs, combined with new 
technologies for renewable power generation offer the opportunity of a disruptive change in 
several of our systems. Power generation tends to be a very centralised industry, dependent 
as it has historically been on high investment in large power stations, whether coal, gas, or 
nuclear powered. Although this is still true also for major hydro, wave or tidal projects, both 
solar and wind, as well as micro-hydro technologies, offer the opportunity for a highly 
decentralised power generation capacity, which is also much more scalable, as capacity can 
  
be added in small increments as, when and where required. For EVs this also provides new 
opportunities, which are particularly realisable in rural areas where land is available for such 
technologies. IC does not provide this option, as it would require not only an oil-ǁell iŶ oŶe͛s 
backyard, but also a refinery. This energy transformation would form an important element 
of the new EV business model, which could therefore be disruptive not only in automotive 
terms, but also in energy terms and will provide new scope for entrepreneurial entrants into 
the energy generating, supply and distribution business. 
McKinsey (2009) argued that carbon emissions from IC can be significantly reduced, but 
ultimately the scope here is limited by certain inherent characteristics of internal 
combustion technology. Only EVs give the option – provided a zero carbon generating mix is 
developed – of ultimately zero carbon aŶd zeƌo toǆiĐ eŵissioŶs tƌaŶspoƌt. UŶdeƌ MĐKiŶseǇ͛s 
͚hǇďƌid-and-eleĐtƌiĐ͛ sĐeŶaƌio, a 49% reduction in CO2 emissions is obtained, compared to 
their baseline scenario. This amounts to a 22% reduction compared with 2006 global 
emission levels. This scenario assumes a mix of vehicles with a number of different 
powertrains. Moving the whole of the global vehicle fleet to electric would amount to an 
81% reduction in well-to-wheel carbon emissions by 2030, compared to their baseline 
scenario (McKinsey, 2009).3 
An earlier McKinsey study (McKinsey, 2003) found that the car industry typically reduces 
Đosts peƌ Đaƌ ďǇ aƌouŶd €ϯϬϬϬ every 13 years (= roughly two model generations). At the 
saŵe tiŵe, ŵaŶufaĐtuƌeƌs tǇpiĐallǇ add aƌouŶd €ϰϬϬϬ of ĐoŶteŶt to ǀehiĐles. This leads to a 
gradual increase in vehicle costs, but for Europe at least, the overall picture for all three 
electric technology options turns out better than for North America or Asia, because of 
historically high fuel costs. Thus both HEV and PHEV provide the owner with a net benefit 
over the first five years of ownership compared to IC while, for the same reason, the 
additional cost of a BEV is lower in Europe than in North America, Japan, or China (McKinsey 
2009: 20). In addition, some of the increase in content could be provided by electric 
powertrain as it offers a range of user benefits, including home charging, energy storage as 
part of a smart grid system, lower NVH (noise, vibration, harshness) levels, improved 
acceleration, lower maintenance, etc. This could partially compensate for the higher cost of 
the technology; so higher cost, but also more content and value.  
Discussion 
Apart from Ford in the period 1914-1940, Tesla͛s ďusiŶess ŵodel is not quite as novel as has 
been argued and certain elements of it at least could be said to have precedents (Wells and 
Nieuwenhuis 2015). They argue, for example, that Smart and others have pre-figured many 
of the business model innovations offered by Tesla, including (with Daewoo) fixed price or 
͚Ŷo-haggle͛ sales. Like Tesla, Smart, at the time of its introduction in 1997, embodied a high 
risk strategy for Daimler-Benz in that it simultaneously included a radical new vehicle 
concept aimed at an untried and untested market segment, combined with a radically new 
factory of unusual design and operation. In addition, this led to new supplier relationships 
involving a small number of system integrators co-located with the assembly plant, as well 
as a new distribution and sales approach, which included a new brand. Initially at least, this 
also included mobility packages including tie-ins with rail service providers, and a focus on 
͚gƌeeŶ͛ ĐoŶsumers. Likewise, Tesla͛s Poǁeƌǁall sǇsteŵ iŶteƌfaĐiŶg ďetǁeeŶ Đaƌ aŶd house, is 
similar to systems already offered by Mitsubishi, Nissan and Toyota in Japan, while Toyota 
even offers the kit-house to go with it. 
                                                          
3 The various reports published by the McKinsey consultancy carry considerable weight in this 
context and are used both by industry and government. 
  
Other vehicle manufacturers have attempted to make major shifts in their value capture. 
Ford, for example, in around 2000 under Jac Nasser attempted to shift the centre of gravity 
of the business downstream by buying into, among others, fast-fit outlet KwikFit and vehicle 
dismantling operations in the US to control the supply of used parts. The project was rapidly 
abandoned. During this period Ford also bought Norwegian EV maker Th!nk Nordic, 
although it too was subsequently sold. The Tesla business model, however, also benefits 
from other revenue streams, such as the income Tesla obtains selling zero emission credits 
to others (at one stage amounting to 12 per cent of revenues), and selling battery packs to 
Daimler for the electric version of the Smart used in the innovative Car2Go schemes and 
Toyota for the PHEV version of the RAV4 (Wells and Nieuwenhuis, 2015). Both Daimler and 
Toyota have invested in Tesla in the past.  
As illustrated by figures 3 and 4, then, EV business models currently differ significantly from 
the more traditional IC business model. Whether this is a permanent feature, or a short- 
term feature as key players position themselves such that they can identify and benefit from 
any areas that may be potentially profitable in order to then outsource any other activities 
to third parties, or whether this picture shows a long term business model format is as yet 
unclear. We are essentially in a transition period and it is too early to tell what business 
models may emerge from the present phase. As Rajala and Westerlund (2007) argue, 
ďusiŶess ŵodels eǀolǀe dǇŶaŵiĐallǇ aŶd a fiƌŵ͛s ďusiŶess ŵodel pƌeseŶts a sŶap-shot, 
representing the activities of the business at a specific point in time. However, even in a 
period of flux, where some of these alternative business models are seen to work, they can 
be very disruptive of more established models, if only by making people question the validity 
of those established models. 
It is also important to note that both these business model case studies feature involvement 
by the public sector. EVs aƌe Ŷot Ǉet tƌulǇ ͚ŵaƌket ƌeadǇ͛ aŶd still ƌelǇ to varying extent on 
government, either through R&D support or market incentives. Although not apparent from 
the figures, this is currently a fundamental part of all EV business models. Thus, while 
Autolib was created in direct response to a local government tender, Tesla obtained a 
US$465 million government loan on generous terms while the initial public offering in 2010 
raised only US$226 million. While Tesla repaid the loan almost ten years early, in 2013, that 
initial vote of confidence from Federal funds helped underwrite the expansion of the 
business at the Fremont assembly plant and encouraged other investors to commit. This is 
an important issue for the future of government intervention. It is apparent that simple 
ƌeliaŶĐe oŶ ͚the ŵaƌket͛ to ďƌiŶg foƌth appƌopƌiate solutions is not always feasible in this 
context. Indeed, it has often been government or public-funded R&D (including that 
conducted at universities) that has generated most of the key technological breakthroughs 
of the contemporary era, from decoding the human genome to the creation of the Internet. 
Equally, government helps frame the market in important ways through fiscal arrangements, 
regulatory interventions and the ability to underwrite long-term structural investments 
(Mazzucato 2013). Such actions then create the space within which entrepreneurs can enter, 
develop new markets with new business models that potentially disrupt established 
regimes. 
Conclusions 
Business models in the EV world are still emerging and evolving, as they must do in response 
to shifting contexts. One point that emerges from this analysis is that the notion of a 
business model needs to extend well beyond the formal boundaries of the business itself; 
and beyond the boundaries of a particular point in time. Not only should it take a full value 
chain perspective, extending into wider networks, but it should also ultimately include a 
consideration of context and environment, oƌ ͚ƌegiŵe͛ ;Geels, ϮϬϬϮͿ, particularly in the role 
  
of government. It should also be emphasized that EV business models are still emerging; 
they are by no means fully formed and should in any case be considered dynamic entities, as 
highlighted by Rajala and Westerlund (2007). Companies like Bolloré have the resources and 
the insight to aim at the long-term prize, so it would be a mistake to rush to judgment on an 
unfinished strategy. In fact, their current approach is more about assessing where in the 
section of the value chain money can be made and which are thus worth retaining in-house, 
and then gradually outsourcing those activities, or links in the chain, where others are better 
placed to capture value. 
 
On the other hand, as Wells and Nieuwenhuis (2015) and in a broader context Mazzucato 
(2013) argue, perhaps the state also needs to be more innovative and to take more risks, but 
also to be more interested in sharing the rewards if those risks are then translated into 
success. In this sense, perhaps, the state needs to act more like an investor, and in so doing 
can perhaps channel the rewards of investment back into further risk underwriting activities 
thereby fostering a more entrepreneurial climate in the economy. The business models 
literature tends to rather underplay the role of the state as a pivotal agency defining market 
possibilities, and yet a business model in a sector like that for EVs that ignores the role of the 
state is at best only partial. The state at national and international level is pivotal in 
regulatory framing, and in steering developments that are critical to the success or failure of 
EV business models, currently often through incentives, for example or facilitating charging 
infrastructures. In the longer term, the incremental extensions of EV business models either 
backwards or forwards along the value chain may come to be seen as temporary expedients, 
as already suggested for Groupe Bolloré.  
 
Alternatively, these developments and the emerging business models may ultimately come 
to facilitate the realization of the circular economy. One thing that seems obvious at the 
moment is that making more than 70 million cars a year worldwide is unsustainable by any 
measure. This will be even more the case with increasing electrification of the powertrain, as 
the embedded carbon then becomes greater than the carbon emitted in use (Hawkins et al. 
2012). So, the cars we do make, whatever they are like, will have to be made in smaller 
numbers and last significantly longer (Nieuwenhuis 1994, 2008). Modularity was a feature of 
the car in its early days where chassis and body were often sourced from different suppliers 
direct by the customer and this may be a way forward. Engines and transmissions are still to 
a large extent modular and can be upgraded relatively easily.  New developments such as 3D 
printing also open up avenues for customization and upgrading either by the owner, or in 
behalf of the owner by local specialists. Such developments could also open the door to 
more radical new business models such as micro-factory retailing (Nieuwenhuis and Wells, 
2003; 2009; Wells, 2013; Nieuwenhuis 2014). 
 
That the Đaƌ should ďe sŵalleƌ aŶd lighteƌ is Đleaƌ, iŶ liŶe ǁith AŵoƌǇ LoǀiŶs͛ HǇpeƌĐaƌ 
concept, although it will still need to be tough enough to last several decades; and capable 
of development. This may require different ways of making cars; a few cars are possible  
pointers to such future cars, notably products like the Gordon Murray Design T25 and T27, 
Riversimple Rasa, Axon, Twike, but also Tesla, Nissan Leaf, Renault Zoe and Twizy, Smart, the 
original Insight from Honda, and the BMW i3. The latter is significaŶt iŶ that it is Ŷot ͚just͛ aŶ 
EV, but also introduces a new way of making cars. In a sense it reintroduces modularity in 
that it has a separate carbonfibre body structure fitted to an aluminium chassis. This gives 
the potential to mix and match different body and chassis units. In addition, cars will 
ďeĐoŵe ICT platfoƌŵs foƌ ǁhiĐh supplieƌs deǀelop ͚apps͛. EaĐh Đustoŵeƌ/oǁŶeƌ ǁould 
choose apps useful for his or her type of car use, while other apps would not be used. Thus 
future cars will need to be lighter, more durable, more reconfigurable and adaptable, more 
  
integrated with their infrastructure and in many cases shared. They are also most likely 
driven by electricity, either directly stored on board, or generated on board by some kind of 
range extender or fuel cell, or possibly supplied by the infrastructure as they are driven 
along.  
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